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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we describe an event during a pediatric oncology research meeting that prompted 
the discussion of the ways in which hermeneutics brings a different kind of understanding to 
both research and practice. We claim that oncology is the practical science of handling natural 
science research and as such practice in oncology is deeply hermeneutic in character in its recog-
nition of the importance, vitality, and generativity of the “individual case” even in the face of 
amassed, verified, and aggregate knowledge that is given from the natural science research. On-
cology is always contingent, next case handling, and is not identifiable simply as something de-
termined and guided by natural sciences alone. In the face of this, we propose that there is an ob-
vious, profound, and natural fit of hermeneutic research in understanding the lives, relationships, 
suffering, and experiences that are affected by cancer. 
 
 
Keywords 
 
childhood cancer, Gadamer, hermeneutics, pediatric oncology, Robert Buckman 
The impetus for this paper arose during an 
Alberta Children’s Hospital pediatric oncolo-
gy research day in November 2012 in Calgary, 
Alberta where dedicated researchers present-
ed the work they were currently conducting in 
efforts to cure, treat, and make sense of child-
hood cancer. Most of the research presented 
was that of bench and natural science, under-
standing the progression of tumours, the im-
pact of radiation on mice, randomized control 
trials, or evidence of the potential of a new 
chemotherapeutic agent. Dr. Nancy Moules, 
Alberta Children’s Hospital Foundation and 
Research Institute Nursing Professorship in 
Child and Family Centred Cancer Care, pre-
sented her research on understanding the im-
pact of childhood cancer on lives and rela-
tionships, and her research approach of her-
meneutics. In this context with this audience, 
it is a shared understanding that there is a very 
human experience of cancer and an apprecia-
tion that bench science offers one way of 
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knowing that must be translated in another 
kind of knowing that is handled in the day-to-
day practical decisions, judgments about, and 
interactions with those undergoing such expe-
riences. Cancer is readily understood as an 
affliction that can affect all aspects of a per-
son’s life, a phenomenon replete with com-
plex and often contradictory cultural, histori-
cal, and personal/familial understandings, as-
sumptions, hopes, fears, and expectations. 
There exists a whole world of lived experi-
ence that precedes bench science and provides 
it with the contexts of its application and the 
conditions of its value.  
 
Moules, in her description of hermeneu-
tics as a legitimate research method in under-
standing cancer, moved past the very public 
cry for finding “cures” for cancer and into the 
lives of people who have cancer, who may or 
may not be treated successfully, who may die, 
who may suffer losses to their sense of self, 
their body image, or their peace of mind. 
There is something inherently difficult when 
we add this mention of suffering. Over and 
above the sought-for clarities of bench sci-
ence, doctors, nurses, and other health profes-
sionals must learn to live with what they 
know and to handle this knowledge well, with 
a sense of dignity and proportion that is acute-
ly aware that this knowledge inevitably in-
vokes a whole life-world of experience and 
faces medical practitioners and patients and 
families alike with the experience of suffering. 
In the valuation of research that seeks for cure, 
there is hope and fear, and an awed waiting 
upon the presumed inevitable triumph of sci-
ence. Hermeneutics is a form of research into 
the effects of cancer on individuals and fami-
lies, as well as the effects of cancer on those 
treating such individuals and families, a 
method that opens a way to inquiry into all of 
these considerations, in all their awkwardness 
and difficulty. Yet, in this context, as in many 
others, hermeneutics is again and again re-
quired to account for itself, while all along 
addressing the suffering that is attendant upon 
childhood cancer. Hermeneutics is frequently 
asked to live up to the ways, means, and 
methods of the natural sciences.    
 
In addressing the issue of numbers and 
power in this kind of research, Moules briefly 
outlined some of the ideas in Dr. David 
Jardine's (1992) “The Fecundity of the Indi-
vidual Case” which demonstrated the 
strengths that surround hermeneutic work and 
the vital importance of hermeneutics as a way 
to understand the living character of our liv-
ing professions. It is in the power of the par-
ticular - in the recognition of one voice, one 
experience, one diminishment of suffering, 
one experience of healing - that our profes-
sions have always found their real power and 
their real, living knowledge. It is in the mo-
ment of being present at the death of one 
child; or watching one patient walk for the 
first time on artificial limbs; or the privilege 
of being present while this family hears bad 
news or good news. It is in the richness of the 
power of these individual, particular moments 
of grace, kinship, and human relationship 
where the professions have always found their 
own graceful and powerful place - in the con-
text of one human life, here and now, in this, 
and this, and this (Wallace, 1987). 
 
In this forum and in reaction to this 
sketching out of the nature of hermeneutic 
knowledge and its place in our profession, Dr. 
Peter Craighead, Professor and Head of the 
Department of Oncology at Tom Baker Can-
cer Centre, rose and said, in response. “Yes, 
this makes sense to me. Isn’t all of oncology 
hermeneutic?” 
 
A part of this response was rooted in Dr. 
Craighead's respect for a recently deceased 
colleague. Dr. Robert Buckman died at 63 
years of age on October 9, 2011. A renowned 
medical oncologist, author, and comedian, Dr. 
Buckman was known for his unorthodox ap-
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proach to illness and death. He was reported 
to have once commented that it was the indi-
vidual person who changed his practice every 
time. In this regard, Dr. Buckman was argu-
ing for something subtly hermeneutic about 
his practice and about the knowledge that 
arises only in practice. It was not simply that 
the individual patient was more important 
than his aggregate knowledge of oncology, 
but that the confrontation with the individual, 
the particular, always enlivened, challenged, 
and informed that very knowledge, keeping it 
awake, alert, and in proper perspective. He 
held his amassed professional knowledge with 
a certain readiness and “lightness,” as could 
always be seen from the often sheer delight 
with which he greeted “the next case.” The 
next case always seemed to arrive as an op-
portunity to open up his vast knowledge and 
to let it be susceptible to what enlivening dif-
ference this new arrival might make. He em-
bodied this openness with his patients, with 
the general public, and in relation to his own 
suffering. Dr. Buckman provided us with a 
strong confirmation of the vitality and im-
portance of hermeneutics to professional life 
and practice, as demonstrated in the title of 
one of his books, Cancer is a Word, Not a 
Sentence (2006). 
 
For the experienced practitioner, the arri-
val of “the next case” involves its arrival into 
a territory of knowledge and experience for 
which that case provides a live and rich occa-
sioning of our attention. The experienced 
practitioner is one who must remain open to 
such arrivals and the differences that can be 
made to them, to us and to the life and well-
being of the living discipline(s) we are inhab-
iting with our patients and their families. The 
word “case,” long since incorporated into 
medical, legal, and other professional speech, 
has this sense of arrival in its origin. Case de-
rives from the Latin casus, meaning a chance, 
occasion, opportunity; accident, mishap. Lit-
erally, it means “a falling.” In the 13th century, 
it had the meaning of “what befalls one” and 
in the 18th century began to be adopted by 
medicine (Online Etymology Dictionary, 
2012). A case is something that has befallen 
one. Despite the professional control implied 
in the “case history” or the “case study,” 
when a doctor or nurse meets a person with 
cancer, something “befalls” the professional 
too. The next case of a patient is not simply 
an “existential” matter of it being this person 
and no one else, and therefore a matter of the 
irreplaceable life of this individual who is not 
replaceable in their suffering with anyone else. 
All this is certainly true. The issue is what 
difference it makes to those of us who already 
know much about such suffering, who have 
already witnessed a long line of symptoms 
and presentations and varieties of heartache or 
fear or bold readiness to do “battle” with the 
invader.  
 
The issue is how our knowledge is not 
simply “amassed verified knowledge” (Gad-
amer, 1989, p. xxi) anonymously held in 
some figurative storehouse, so that this new 
arrival simply gets slotted into the right locale 
of that store. Our knowledge is also a form of 
readiness for new experience it opens towards 
this new arrival in anticipation of being called 
to account, of being summoned and needing 
to respond professionally, “properly,” in ways 
that Gadamer (1989) described as “relations 
of responding and summoning” (p. 458). This 
describes the profound vulnerability of our 
professional bearing that we deliberately 
make ourselves and what we know suscepti-
ble to the subtleties of what is arriving. More 
than this, it is because we are experienced 
that we are able to find this carrying of our-
selves practicable, day-to-day. This suscepti-
bility is a matter of how we experience our 
experience; whether we can see ourselves not 
only out of the authority of our expertise, but 
also as being experienced by the other. Expe-
rience in this sense includes humility; it is 
permeable and reciprocal, and inevitably at-
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tendant upon that which it does not produce 
from itself and its own storehouse of 
knowledge. 
 
As Gadamer (1996) noted in his essay 
Hermeneutics and Psychiatry, “…the doctor 
needs more than just scientific and technical 
knowledge and professional experience” (p. 
172). The doctor or the nurse also needs a 
well-honed sense of practical knowledge and 
practical judgment, wherein individual cases 
are treated with a sense of proper proportion 
borne of practice itself (what Aristotle called 
phronesis rather than techne). These two 
forms of knowledge are not in a battle with 
one another for the same territory or voice, 
but neither is one simply replaceable for the 
other or able to do the work of the other.  
“Although the expertise of a technical 
knowledge...has a proximity to phronesis, 
technical knowledge does not ask the question 
of the good or the just comprehensively, or it 
does not allow us to act comprehensively in 
each situation” (Gadamer, 2007b, p. 232). An 
experienced hematologist/oncologist col-
league offered this view:  
 
I deal with very nasty malignant diseas-
es. Fatal if our therapies don’t work. Each 
of these diseases can be categorized under 
broad headings and, as our knowledge 
advances, increasingly narrow sub-
headings. Such a degree of organization 
implies that a process of inquiry about 
this disease has revealed enough to form 
the basis of a broadly accepted approach 
to the disease, a therapeutic plan, a man-
agement strategy. For many disease enti-
ties we have such an approach.  “You 
have disease X and the book says do this.” 
It doesn’t always work as well as is hoped 
but at least we have a plan. This makes 
medicine sound quite formulaic and from 
a biomedical perspective this is what we 
strive for - - the magic formula. A moment 
of reflection will reveal that these formu-
lae provide strategies for managing dis-
eases. But diseases exist in people and our 
magic formulae rarely take that into ac-
count.  
 
Hermeneutics provides a form of research 
geared to precisely such difficult accounting. 
It does so by reformulating what it means to 
“apply” what one knows in a specific case. It 
is not that those who practice within the natu-
ral sciences and help to develop such 
knowledge that provide formulae do not care 
about individual cases; they do this work be-
cause they care deeply. Hermeneutics, how-
ever, maintains that the difficulty of these 
cases and the complexity of the human expe-
rience of them can be understood and known. 
Science might question the study of such 
things as perhaps only subjective, private, and 
even indemonstrable, or that if they are to be 
studied, they must be subjected to the particu-
lar rigour of the scientific method. Hermeneu-
tics provides a way to study human experi-
ence that does not subject it to the demands of 
the natural sciences, but still provides dynam-
ic, rich, compelling, and detailed understand-
ing and description that leaves all of their dif-
ficulty and ambiguity in place and makes it 
available to thinking, communication, sharing, 
and a deeper understanding of, and sensitivity 
to, the subtleties of lived experience. 
 
Hermeneutics also provides ways to im-
prove practice through studies of lived expe-
rience by pointing to the layers of ambiguous 
entailment in which live with our patients – 
the coming of the death of a child is trouble-
some, terrible, surrounded by myriad tales, 
images, and fears. Understanding this in detail 
improves the practice of oncology, not by 
“nailing down” something more securely but 
by honing and shaping our ability to be aware 
of and articulate our lived surroundings. 
 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer (1989) 
demonstrated how understanding, in this her-
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meneutic sense, is “more a passion than an 
action” (p. 366). It is not the application of a 
rule to a case but more like the application of 
a case to a rule. Our already established 
“magic formulae” must befall and respond to 
the demands that the new case brings and ex-
pects of such knowledge. This knowledge is 
something we must therefore “undergo,” 
something we must “suffer.” In choosing to 
work in an area such as oncology, one agrees 
to this hermeneutic wager, to a willingness to 
not only suffer but to “suffer together” in the 
way that Moules (1999) wrote of compassion 
as a hermeneutic endeavor that is willful and 
deliberate.  
 
This is why Gadamer suggested that at the 
heart of this living knowledge is an old Greek 
adage: pathei mathos: “learning through suf-
fering” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 356), an idea itself 
inherited from the Greek tragedies of Aeschy-
lus (c. 525 BCE). The hermeneutic tradition 
recognizes that there is something inherently 
difficult and transformative in the act of be-
coming experienced in the ways of the world, 
and from such a process “no one can be ex-
empt” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 355). This claim 
about experience extends across the whole 
gamut of human life, from small, exhilarating 
interruptions of one’s expectations (moments 
of inquiry, learning, engagement, investiga-
tion, questioning) to traumatic experiences of 
mortality, impermanence, and illness (mo-
ments considered “life changing”). In all these 
cases, the learning and teaching that ensues is 
understood as “an adventure and, like any ad-
venture, it always involves some risk” (Gad-
amer, 1983, p. 141), including, of necessity, 
“moments of loss of self” (Gadamer, 1977, p. 
51) wherein who I understand myself to be 
and what I understand of the world might 
have to endure suffering change. This is why, 
as professionals, we are drawn towards the 
suffering of others because it is there that we 
experience a deep insight into our shared hu-
man lot. This, again, recalls the example of Dr. 
Buckman and his willingness to step into the 
suffering of others and to use his own suffer-
ing as way to help others. 
 
Application is neither a subsequent nor 
merely an occasional part of the phenom-
enon of [hermeneutic] understanding, but 
codetermines it as a whole form the be-
ginning. This does not mean that…he first 
understands [some pregiven universal] per 
se, and then afterward uses it for particu-
lar applications. Rather, the interpreter 
seeks no more than to understand this uni-
versal -- i.e., to understand what it says, 
what constitutes [its] meaning and signifi-
cance. In order to understand that, he must 
not try to disregard himself and his partic-
ular hermeneutical situation. He must re-
late [it] to this situation if he wants to un-
derstand at all. (Gadamer, 1989, p. 324) 
 
This next patient, this next presentation of 
symptoms, these next uttered words of con-
cern, do not simply “fall under” general prin-
ciples or established knowledge, but ask 
something of this knowledge. They ask of the 
general principle that it proves itself “in this 
case” to be adequate to such a case. This abil-
ity to deftly judge the relationship between 
established knowledge and the arrival of a 
new case is itself a type of practical 
knowledge that does not operate in the same 
way as the establishment of that natural scien-
tific knowledge itself. It is, rather, a cluster of 
contingent practical judgments. One can be-
come practiced in such judgments, but one 
cannot give a set of rules for how to make 
such judgments because those rules, in turn, 
would require cultivating, in practice, an un-
derstanding of their application. 
 
Each patient is embarking on a difficult 
journey on a road that is unknown to 
them. A part of our responsibility as phy-
sicians is to prepare our patients for the 
journey and then walk with them. That 
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comes partly by providing them with in-
sight about what may lie ahead and the 
likelihood of having to change plans ac-
cording to what happens on the jour-
ney. The conversation needs to be ongoing 
and open-ended. Things change. I start 
such a conversation by asking the patient 
and family to explain to me what they 
know about their disease and what is be-
ing offered. For me, it defines the starting 
point and strategy of our ongoing conver-
sation and it is often a unique starting 
point and always a unique strategy. 
 
The hermeneutic object of interest is the abil-
ity, in practice, to recognize a case as a case 
of some general principle, as a case that ex-
emplifies it, modifies it, defies it, or “nearly 
fits” or demands that our established 
knowledge gain more subtlety, differentiation, 
and acuity. This judgment is not a matter of 
simply applying the general principle to the 
case, but allowing the case to “speak back” to 
that already-established knowledge in such a 
way that the case puts the principle into ques-
tion and demands that the knowledge already 
established gives an account of its applicabil-
ity in the face of the demands made by the 
case: 
 
The ordering of life by rules of law…is 
incomplete and needs productive supple-
mentation. At issue is always something 
more than the correct application of gen-
eral principles. Our knowledge…is always 
supplemented by the individual case, even 
productively determined by it. The judge 
not only applies the law in concreto, but 
contributes through his very judgment to 
developing the law. [Our knowledge] is 
constantly developed through the fecundi-
ty of the individual case. (Gadamer, 1989, 
p. 38)  
 
The individual case on which judgment 
works is never simply a case; it is not ex-
hausted by being a particular example of a 
universal law or concept. Rather, it is al-
ways an “individual case,” and it is signif-
icant that we call it a special case, because 
the rule does not [and cannot] compre-
hend [this individuality]. Every judgment 
about something intended in its concrete 
individuality (e.g., the judgment required 
in a situation that calls for action) is -- 
strictly speaking -- a judgment about a 
special case. That means nothing less than 
that judging the case involves not merely 
applying the universal principle according 
to which it is judged, by co-determining, 
supplement, and correcting that principle. 
(Gadamer, 1989, p. 39) 
 
Negotiating this susceptibility of estab-
lished knowledge to the arrival of the next 
case is the work of hermeneutics and it is the 
work of oncology. “The true locus of herme-
neutics is this in-between” (Gadamer, 1989, p. 
295). This is how professions, of necessity, 
are not simply the impervious and imperial 
wielding of “amassed verified knowledge.” 
Professionals seek out instances of suffering 
or undergoing, instances of susceptibility 
where the locale of meeting a challenge to our 
knowledge is at once a locale of meeting our 
patient “in” this suffering, “in” the locale of 
taking seriously their arrival as requiring us, 
with all our aggregate knowledge of, and fa-
miliarity with, such matters, to engage this 
arrival. We, like them, must allow what we 
know to come into play with the person that 
has arrived with questions, knowledge, fears, 
concerns, evidence, foibles, resolve, and all 
the particularities of presentation. This is the 
negotiation that is at the heart of diagnosis, 
that our aggregate knowledge is not simply a 
slot into which the new patient fits, but is, ra-
ther, something that must, with great subtlety, 
respond well to that arrival and let that arrival 
do the work proper to its particularity. We 
know, as professionals, that we can, with 
those new to our profession, lay out the crite-
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ria of a particular pathology, but we cannot 
outrun the difficulty of recognizing this case 
as an example of that pathology.   
 
I met with the patient and family to dis-
cuss what we had to offer to treat the leu-
kemia and our chances of success. They 
asked insightful questions. I was told, “if 
my number is up there is nothing I can do 
about it but let’s try our best.”  There was 
a peace in the room. The treatment went 
well at the beginning but then went off the 
rails. Each challenge was faced with de-
termination and a calmness as “the num-
ber” came up. Our conversations had re-
mained easy despite the increasing gravity 
of what we were discussing and often we 
had shared a laugh. After many weeks of 
struggle, the patient passed away with the 
family at their side.  
 
This is a practical form of knowledge that 
cannot be amassed theoretically, nor can it be 
simply handed over to another professional 
without that person having to now cultivate 
this knowledge for him or herself.   
 
A common adage in the work of oncology 
is the “experienced” practitioner. Hermeneu-
tics identifies how “becoming experienced” is 
not a matter of simply an increased expertise 
in “amassed verified [bench science] 
knowledge” (Gadamer 1989, p. xxi) but an 
increased deftness in how one “handles” such 
knowledge in practice. Being experienced 
does not culminate in knowing more and bet-
ter than anyone else (the sort of required ex-
pertise in the “amassed verified knowledge” 
of one’s field requisite of being “knowledge-
able in the field”). Hermeneutics points to an-
other vital and essential form of knowledge 
and experience that are not of the same kind 
of knowledge as this expertise. “Experience 
has its proper fulfillment not in definitive 
[amassed] knowledge but in the openness to 
[new] experience[s] that is made possible by 
experience itself” (Gadamer 1989, p. 355). An 
experienced doctor or nurse, therefore, is not 
simply someone who as been in such a pro-
fession for many years. Being experienced, in 
hermeneutics, is connected with an old con-
cept from the Humanist tradition: Bildung 
(Bruford, 2010; Gadamer, 1989; Pinar, 2011; 
von Humbolt 2000), a German term meaning 
self-formation, that is, the endured process of 
becoming someone in the act of coming to 
know about oneself and the world. This site of 
becoming someone is the site of pathei 
mathos because it requires a type of “under-
going” or “suffering” in which one risks be-
coming changed and having to live with the 
consequences. 
 
I met with the patient and family to dis-
cuss what we had to offer to treat the leu-
kemia and our chances of success. They 
asked insightful questions. I was told, “if 
my number is up there is nothing I can do 
about it but let’s try our best.”  There was 
palpable fear in the room and the patient 
looked truly terrified. The next questions 
were, “what will happen to me?” and 
“what are my chances?” I started over 
again and tried a different approach. The 
treatment went badly from an early 
stage. Each challenge was faced with de-
termination but the terror never left the 
patient’s eyes. I was never sure if my con-
versations were answering their questions 
or addressing their needs. After many 
weeks of struggle, the patient passed away 
with the family at their side. 
 
This situation started and ended the same as 
the one described before it, but in the middle 
of it something changed, something that 
called the oncologist to realize that no amount 
of amassed and aggregate knowledge or mas-
tery of such knowledge, no “magic formulae,” 
could save the oncologist from the “delibera-
tion and decision” to move and act differently 
in this case (Gadamer, 1983, p. 113). Gada-
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mer advanced the idea of hermeneutics as a 
condition of being human, an inescapable 
immersion in making sense of the world, but 
always finitely, always open to re-
interpretation. This does not mean, however, 
that hermeneutic reflection is automatic. Bild-
ung demands effort and practice; hermeneutic 
experience has an ethical dimension of choos-
ing to make oneself available to the difficulty 
of life, the pathei mathos. In this encounter, 
the oncologist persevered in the face of the 
disease, in facing the terror in the patient’s 
eyes, and in facing the fact that he could nev-
er be sure. 
 
Concluding Reflections 
 
When a diagnosis is confirmed for a patient, 
or particular symptoms are described as such, 
the oncologist is able to “hear” a wide range 
of possibilities and probabilities. There is an 
ability to know, from long experience, some-
thing of a patient's possible future(s) and pos-
sible future suffering in ways that someone 
without this expertise simply could not. This 
is not exactly the same as simply “having the 
facts” but rather knowing that the facts alone 
will not save you or address the situation. 
There is that wonderful/terrible weight of then 
having to decide what might be best to say or 
not say, to indicate, or clothe, or to be 
straightforward about. This sort of judgment 
and its soundness and trustworthiness is an 
amazing thing. As professionals knowledgea-
ble in our fields, we sometimes hold back in 
having a patients bear all the weight of what 
could be said, not to be dishonest, but to be 
measured and to try to act properly, in proper 
proportion to the best reading that can given 
of the full breadth of the circumstances. This 
is something of why and how we are profes-
sionals and not only technicians in possession 
of amassed scientific knowledge: 
 
The way of life of human beings is not 
fixed by nature like other living beings. 
Knowingly preferring one thing to another 
and consciously choosing among possible 
alternatives is the unique and specific 
characteristic of human being. The 
knowledge that gives direction to action is 
essentially called for by concrete situa-
tions in which we are required to choose 
the thing to be done and no learned and 
mastered technique can spare us the task 
of deliberation and decision. (Gadamer, 
2007b, pp. 230-231) 
 
Even though we slowly, through practice 
and experience, become more receptive to the 
arrival of the next case and the difference it 
will bring, it always also feels like the first 
time as well; it feels brand new - - this family, 
that child, those odd descriptions of symp-
toms, real, imagined, dreamt, feared, or seen 
with terrible clarity. As Buckman reminded us, 
walking into the room of the next patient will 
forever change our practices, but this requires 
an awareness that something has changed as 
well as an opening not to just find what fits 
with what we already know but what informs 
us anew. Gadamer (2007a) suggested that 
“[the world] compels over and over, and the 
better one knows it, the more compelling it is. 
This is not a matter of mastering an area of 
study” (p. 115). 
 
This is the practical knowledge or “being 
experienced” that is the object of research in 
hermeneutic work and it: 
 
does have a certain proximity to the expert 
knowledge that is proper to technique, but 
what separates it fundamentally from 
technical expertise is that it expressly asks 
the question of the good--for example, 
about the best way of life [or about what 
course of action would be better than oth-
ers]. It does not merely master an ability, 
like technical expertise, whose task is set 
by an outside authority [e.g., the methods 
of natural science in producing experi-
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mental results, or the simple rote follow-
ing of procedures in a hospital unit] or by 
the purpose to be served by what is being 
produced [e.g., given we have to reduce 
wait times, do this instead of that]. (Gad-
amer, 2007b, p. 232) 
 
Robert Buckman knew something of suf-
fering, but perhaps his greatest wisdom was 
that he did not claim to know it with certainty 
and finality, because he understood that that is 
not our lot, as humans, to know once and for 
all. Even knowledge that has been pinned 
down with great precision by natural scien-
tific methodology does not help us avoid hav-
ing to decide, contingently and carefully, as to 
whether this is a case of that, and if it is, what 
we might now best do with those whose suf-
fering is in our hands. Buckman saw suffering 
as the thing that could only be approached 
through a hermeneutic wager that the next 
“case” would indeed change the face of un-
derstanding the minute the door was opened. 
 
Oncology is world of discovery, of devout 
care and intense search for cure. The natural 
and biological sciences are responsible for 
significant decreases in cancer morbidity, 
long-term cure, and longevity of life. This 
world of science and discovery is vital but 
there is another world inherent in oncology - - 
a world of the individual case, the n=1. This is 
a particular world of suffering that is not dis-
embodied or detached from the rest of the 
world of scientific discovery, for it is fecund 
with its own kind of discovery, where fear 
shows or it does not, and even if the outcomes 
are the same, the process of getting there nev-
er is. It is the argument for the innate fit of 
hermeneutic inquiry and research into the 
worlds of particulars, worlds that do not stand 
alone but have always something to say to the 
next door.  
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